Mark Andrews wrote:
If an end and another end directly share a secret key without involving untrustworthy trusted third parties, the ends are secure end to end.
An untrustworthy but light weight and inexpensive (or free) PKI may worth its price and may be useful to make IP address based security a little better.
Which you can do with DNSSEC but the key management will be enormous.
Which part of my message, are you responding? First part? Though you might have forgotten, my initial proposal of DNSSEC actually allows to use both public and shared keys. Having hierarchical KDCs (Key Distribution Centers), instead of hierarchical CAs, key management is not enormous. Shared key is better than public key, because revocation is instantaneous. Instead, root KDCs receive large amount of requests. But, situation is similar to DNS root servers today and is manageable. Kerberos relies on KDCs. However, the shared keys are shared by ends and intermediate systems of KDCs, which is not end to end security. Masataka Ohta