BCP38 will only ever get implemented if governments and ruling 'net bodies force deployment. There's otherwise very little benefit seen by the access network providers, since the targets are other orgs and the attacks are happening in a different backyard. On 14/01/2014 10:36 AM, Paul Ferguson wrote:
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On 1/13/2014 11:18 PM, Saku Ytti wrote:
On (2014-01-13 21:33 +0000), Bjoern A. Zeeb wrote:
BCP38! I am always surprised when people need crypto if they fail the simple things. Saying that BCP38 is solution to the reflection attacks is not unlike 5 year old wishing nothing but world peace for christmas, endearing, but it's not going to change anything. BCP38 is completely unrealistic, many access networks are on autopilot, many don't have HW support for BCP38, one port configured has low-benefit, only that machine can stop attacking (but whole world). That does *not* make it an unworthy goal, nor should it stop people from encouraging it's implementation.
- - ferg (co-author of BCP38)
- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2
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