On Nov 17, 2023, at 6:58 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 9:31 PM Tom Samplonius <tom@samplonius.org> wrote:
The most surprising thing in the DE-DIX flow chart, was that they check that the origin AS exists in the IRR as-set, before doing RPKI, and if the set existence fails, they reject the route. I don’t see a problem with this, as maintaining as-sets is easy, but it does prevent an eventual 100% RPKI future with no IRR at all.
I don't think the future is ever really 'no irr'. * RPKI provides: "a cryptographically verifiable method to determine authority to use ip number resources" * OriginValidation provides: "A route origin authorization 'database' for use eventually on BGP speakers"
Those both amount to the ability to originate a prefix though.
IRR filters provide control over whom is provided reachability through a particular peering/path.
How does that work? IRR import: and export: parameters are poorly implemented. Is anyone actually validating more than the origin with IRR?
(dale points this out as well, particularly the part about paths he points out)
Tom