The solution to this problem is filtering, which has been known for a long time.
The provoders that have been filtering on the customer edge seem to have done much better in terms of providing sanitized routes. I am wondering how many such major outages need to occur in order to convince some providers to do customer filtering?
i'd argue that filtering is protection against misconfigurations. in practice, the way that filtering is done, it does not protect us from malice; hopefully such attacks would be short-lived because the immediate provider(s) would cut the person off, but even short problems on the scale we're talking about are serious. fortunately most of the wide-scale attacks we've seen have not been within the routing system itself (though some have pounded its infrastructure .. e.g., the low UDP port number attack), but there's always that possibility. in order for filtering to protect us from malicious attacks within the routing system we need a lot more in the way of authentication for registries and tools built on top of them of course that means a lot of work, so people have to first recognize how fragile some of this stuff is. today's excitement is a very good example of that fragility to be clear, i am a fan of registries and filtering as they are currently used .. there is no alternative other than chaos. i just think it's a mistake to think that filtering as we know it now is equivalent to a necessarily robust routing system /jws