-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I told it many times already that the freedom of speech includes not only right to speak but also right not to listen. Internet is very good at the first part; and woefully indaequate at the second. Can it be fixed? Of course. But the first step in filtering out those who are trying to push their unwanted speech on us is to make sure they won't pretend to be somebody whose words we'd want to listen to. So -- the problem has two aspects: the first is authentication, the second is defense against flooding attacks. They are closely related, but not identical. The source address verification is powerful enough to get flood attacks stopped. It is still not enough to get rid of unwanted messages. The second line of defense should be digital signatures on messages, certified by some authorities (what is "authority" depends on your personal point of view -- you're free to choose whom to believe) which to a some extent make sure that signatures correspond to physical people. Then you can just stop accepting any unsigned mail (note that a reputable anonymous remailer would also check signatures on incoming messages; and substitute them with its own). There's no magic technology involved; this is just the problem of how to actually implement it. Until we do that we all live in danger of having our name smeared if some jerk decides he's pissed and posts some nazi propaganda, or threats, with a reputable person's e-mail address. I already was an antisemite, and an agent of KGB, thank you very much. Now, how about doing the right thing: make the NANOG list the first one to require signed messages? Somebody has to start. - --vadim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMtaqSEDODjim2XUVAQFuBwP+N7JhLLT7yFcF8Se7XvfRd9DOPceAa0U5 vvnjbCCEZpq8xWh6H7cMyq3vZdQeFzYnCC6007PQt4AyodJ8DQC77RLL72YthHzz /ZWQdbS7xlJQxsUAFQiZprpeW6cAExRwIiPrKimjx96kvBvufFPeOtLjhV1Vpalo o4e+DHJRGbY= =EMOb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----