On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:07 PM Saku Ytti <saku@ytti.fi> wrote:
Not disputing bug or bog house as ideal location for said policy, just want to explain my perspective why it is so.
So, network device vendors releasing security advisories twice a year isn't a big part of the explanation?
Hitless upgrades are not really a thing yet, even though they've been marketed for 20 years now.
This is correct; on the flip side, hitless vulnerabilities haven't even been marketed, much less invented.
Only reason things work as well as they do, is because bad guys are not trying to DoS the infrastructure with BGP or packet-of-deaths
Err... don't they? My experience is quite the opposite.
If this is something we think should be fixed, then we should have good guys intentionally fuzzing _public internet_ BGP and transit-packet-of-deaths with good reporting.
If we could be sure that after such fuzzing there would still be a working transport infrastructure to report on top of, then yes.
if they are abused, Internet will fix those in no more than days
— just like we did with IoT in 2016 —
and trying to guarantee it cannot happen probably is fools errant
If anything, I suspect if it's cheaper to enter the market with inferior security and quality then that is likely good business case
This is also correct so far. I wonder if it's here to stay. -- Töma