-----Original Message----- From: tedawson@attbi.com [mailto:tedawson@attbi.com]
Comments inline: At 01:34 PM 2/17/2003 -0500, Charles Youse wrote:
So do you suppose that in my scenario, I'd be better off leaving the VoIP out of the encrypted tunnels and use a separate [cleartext] path for them?
Oh goodness no. VoIP (SIP specifically) has no real security in it. Call hijacking for example is a matter of sending a pair of spoofed UDP packets to each phone and having the voice streams arrive at the attackers machine. Not pretty, and I do this trick (and worse) daily. (in a lab as part of work of course)
What about sips:/TLS, S/MIME, and digest auth? These are all integral to the 'standard', and many popular implementations support these facilities currently. IPSec may be less painful within a single domain, but in other cases, I'd think that these facilities (or their derivatives) are the only practical option for 'real' security. Granted it is all pretty worthless if you dont enable/use any of it... Am I missing something? Regards, Andrew Bender taqua.com