On Mon, 9 Aug 2021 at 19:07, Martijn Schmidt via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:
It's route table pollution if you ask me.. in today's world we have many IXPs and several tier-1 operators that support RPKI ROV, so when you have issued ROAs for the supernet of the IP space in question it'll already significantly reduce the effects of a BGP hijack.
Not just a route table. - RIB scale - FIB scale - Configuration scale We just recently learned of a IOS-XR prefix-set limit of 300001 when a particular customer AS-SET expanded to a higher number of prefixes. The problem with this scaling is that it doesn't reflect an increase of revenue but it reflects an increase of cost. CAPEX to upgrade devices without winning new business and OPEX to manage those upgrades. So it is a somewhat selfish solution to a problem. -- ++ytti