On 05:16 AM 10/24/02, Etaoin Shrdlu wrote:
Alan Hannan wrote:
I don't understand how giving the US federal government management
control
of key components of the Internet will make it more secure.
It worked for airline security.
Sure, searching Ray Charles makes me feel much safer. Asking me whether any one helped me packed my bags or handed me a package always shows whether or not I should be trusted to get on the plane. Stopping a little boy from taking on a toy with a 1 inch long gun makes me feel safer too. These are the same people who can't be trusted to make sure that your luggage flies the same flight you do. Puh-leeze.
There is not one single thing that goes on in airport "security" that contributes one whit to actual security.
Amazingly enough, Admiral James M. Loy - the new COO of the Transportation Security Administration, shows strong signs of having a clue WRT security, see: <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/23/loy.cnna/> In an opinion piece by Joseph Perkins (San Diego Union-Tribune columnist, the article ran in the SF Chronicle on 10/21 but I can't find it online anywhere), it lists a bunch of the present stupid rules, and then goes on to say: So those dictates and others like them, included on Loys' not-so- facetiously named "Stupid Rule List," have been thrown out. The litmus test in each case, he explained, is whether a rule substantively contributes to security or primarily to longer airport lines. There are several online references to this list, see: <http://www.apfa.org/public/articles/News-Events/STUPID_RULES.HTML> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32246-2002Oct15.html> ObNetwork Operations: Does this mean I can once again carry a cable crimper tool with me in my carry on luggage (one was confiscated at SFO a few months ago, the cable cutting blades were deemed a "potential weapon")? jc