Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
* PGP Signed by an unverified key: 04/11/07 at 11:21:15
On Wed, 11 Apr 2007 07:07:19 EDT, "J. Oquendo" said:
these so called rules? Many network operators are required to do a lot of things, one of these things should be the mitigation of malicious traffic from LEAVING their network.
And I want a pony.
We don't even do a (near) universal job of filtering rfc1918 addresses and spoofed addresses. We aren't filtering obvious bogon packets, how do you propose we filter less obvious malicious traffic (is that SYN packet legit, or part of a DDOS, or just a slashdotting of a suddenly popular site?).
* Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> * 0xB4D3D7B0 - Unverified
When you say we, speak for yourself and your own networks. There ARE some people who do take the time to properly design their networks. It is the same "Well since Billy didn't do it neither will I" attitude that makes me never think twice about blocking CIDR's. Since 'THEY' (your "WE") didn't properly configure their network, why should I think twice about letting it into my backyard. I guess its calling for too much for network operators to actually do their work though and I guess considering IPv6 is like how many years away now, I can expect that much of a wait for people to implement what should have been done from the onset. I don't care how filtering gets done from someone else. Like I said if I can watch and control what comes out of my networks using raw tools on nix machines, you cannot with a straight face/typing method tell me that someone at one of these big providers can't clue themselves in to getting malicious traffic controlled. Should someone want to comment about "oh golly the cost is outrageous" I say bs... Its utter laziness from my eyes. So here I go politely pointing it out... If I can do it with a couple of thousand machines on my VERY OWN, not a "team", not a "department" but me, in a matter of minutes, situate my network to not send out crap, then why can't these companies? I'd like to here something logical, not someone's opinion. Something like "According to ARIN/IEEE specifications of foobarfoo, operators are not allowed to view traffic entering or leaving their networks" which hinders this. There is no reason I could think of, no scenario I could imagine, that would prohibit network operators from putting the nail in the coffin with stuff LEAVING THEIR NETS. Note the word LEAVING now. If it doesn't leave, you wouldn't have complaints from some other operator now would you. -- ==================================================== J. Oquendo http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x1383A743 sil . infiltrated @ net http://www.infiltrated.net The happiness of society is the end of government. John Adams