On May 14, 2007, at 2:43 AM, <michael.dillon@bt.com> <michael.dillon@bt.com> wrote:
I do hope that when the UK police get tired of waiting, that they shut down everything in BT's data centre and take it all as evidence. BT deserves at least that, and frankly a whole lot more.
I've already replied privately to Jo offering my help to escalate this internally at BT to the right person. But I would like to point out that BT does not have "a" data centre that can be shut down. BT is a very large network operator with probably hundreds of data centres worldwide.
I knew that. I meant the bt broadband data centre which keeps the log data for user sessions. And anyway, I didn't expect it either. It's an ISP horror story that has happened only a few times. I was simply expressing frustration in saying that BT deserved it.
We also operate multiple IP networks and have many different lines of business. The problem appears to be with the UK consumer Internet line of business. Even though I have nothing to do with that particular group, I will still escalate this issue to make sure that the right people know about it.
Thank you.
While NANOG is a nice stopgap for getting to the right people, it seems to me that we should, collectively, come up with a better system for doing this. If only the RIR databases were verified so that all contacts listed were reading, willing and able to act on abuse issues...
I used Nanog only as a stop-gap because no other lines were working. Checking my nanog sent file, I've done with 7 times over 10 years, so I think I can say that I don't abuse this approach ;-) The RIR data only pointed to abuse@btbroadband.com, and that was getting me nowhere. Their responses to the customer were less than useful. They weren't responding to my requests for escalation at all. -- Jo Rhett senior geek Silicon Valley Colocation Support Phone: 408-400-0550