On Fri, 23 Sep 2016, Christopher Morrow wrote:
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 9:24 PM, Jon Lewis <jlewis@lewis.org> wrote:
On Fri, 23 Sep 2016, Patrick W. Gilmore wrote:
Is CloudFlare able to filter Layer 7 these days? I was under the
impression CloudFlare was not able to do that.
There have been a lot of rumors about this attack. Some say reflection, others say Layer 7, others say .. other stuff. If it is Layer 7, how are you going to ÿÿstep in front of the cannonÿÿ? Would you just pass through all the traffic?
Anycast + load balancers + high powered varnish?
notionally (because I have been paying zero attention to this) jon's suggesting: 1) setup a crapload of nginx/squid/etc configured tightly for things to be accessed behind them 2) ecmp to them across several layers (assume 32 ecmp at each layer, call it 4 layers get craploads of machines running) 3) change over the dns 4) profit--
eh? If you can eat the PPS, you can spray across enough tcp listeners, you can weed out the chaff and start filtering in the 'application'... perhaps also run a 'low bandwidth' version of the target site...
hey look, we invented prolexic.
Well...by anycast, I meant BGP anycast, spreading the "target" geographically to a dozen or more well connected/peered origins. At that point, your ~600G DDoS might only be around 50G per site, and at that level, filtering the obvious crap gets much more reasonable. Then, doing the layer 7 scrubbing of the less obvious crap is more easily dealt with than a single site receiving 600G of attack traffic. I haven't actually done this (specifically for DDoS mitigation)...just speculating as to how it might easily be done given sufficient resources. The trouble is, the attackers have virtually unlimited bandwidth, and aren't constrained by having to pay for the bandwidth. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Jon Lewis, MCP :) | I route | therefore you are _________ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_________