On Sep 24, 2006, at 4:33 PM, Mark Kent wrote:
Remember, we're not talking about RFC1918 space, where there is a BCP that says we should filter it at the edge. We're talking about public IP space, that just doesn't happen to be announced outside of a particular AS.
If the intent is to prevent folks from reaching out and touching random network infrastructure devices directly whilst still allowing traceroute to work, iACLs and/or using IS-IS as one's IGP and null- routing the infrastructure blocks at one's various edges achieves the same effect with less potential for breakage: http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0405/mcdowell.html Note that a good infrastructure addressing plan is a prerequisite for both of these methods. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Roland Dobbins <rdobbins@cisco.com> // 408.527.6376 voice Any information security mechanism, process, or procedure which can be consistently defeated by the successful application of a single class of attacks must be considered fatally flawed. -- The Lucy Van Pelt Principle of Secure Systems Design