On Thu, Sep 04, 1997 at 09:23:49AM -0400, Selina F. Priestley wrote:
Let's turn this into a useful conversation: If we do not believe that getting a backdoor to our keys is a useful way to insure security on the network, maybe isn't even addressing the root issues, then
Nope, it's not. "Ensuring security" implies making certain that _no one_ can get copies of the keys; the entire thesis is shot down by key-escrow.
What *are* the real issues with security on the network? How should we work to address these issues, both at the network and application layers? How will this solve the 'child porn problem'? What are the barriers involved in any proposed solutions?
The real issue _here_ is that the government _does not want_ us to operate 'secure' networks... because then _they_ can't look at the traffic. (CALEA notwithstanding) Oh, and BTW: in light of CALEA, why do they _care_ if they can crack the code? We're required to help them tap the cleartext anyway... (at least, for _network imposed_ encryption).
How can we trace criminals/spam artists/hackers easily and hand them over to the feds w/o handing over our rights as well?
Short answer: we can't.
If we don't have any answers to these questions, and plans for getting there, then we might as well quit our bitching.
As Clancy once put it: you can be a policeman of a soldier... but not both. Are we network operators, or cops? I think we've probably reached the end of the "useful operational content" in this thread... unless anyone has a "this is what _we_ did" story. Cheers, -- jra -- Jay R. Ashworth jra@baylink.com Member of the Technical Staff Unsolicited Commercial Emailers Sued The Suncoast Freenet "People propose, science studies, technology Tampa Bay, Florida conforms." -- Dr. Don Norman +1 813 790 7592