On Tue, 20 Dec 2011 13:37:23 -0300, "Eduardo A. =?iso-8859-1?b?U3XhcmV6?=" said:
what if evil guys hack my mom ISP DNS servers and use RPZ to redirect traffic from mom_bank.com to evil.com?
How can she detect this?
The snarky answer is "If your mom has to ask how she can detect this, she's probably going to be unable to do so". The more technically correct answer is that you can check the IP and TTL as returned by your local caching nameserver, and compare them to the values reported from the authoritative NS for the zone. Of course, this means you have to hit the authoritative server, which sort of defeats the purpose of DNS caching. Or you can deploy DNSSEC. Or you can deploy SSL (not perfect, but it raises the bar considerably). Or you can google for "DNS RPZ" and start reading - the top hit seems to be Paul Vixie's announcement: https://www.isc.org/community/blog/201007/taking-back-dns-0 and start reading - as about the 4th or 5th commenter points out, the threat model is *no* different than a DNS server that forces in its own zones. The commenter is talking in the context of a provider replacing a zone, but it's the same issue if a black hat hacks in a zone.