> Did you test against common equipment

> deployments or did you just measure the field

I have not conducted any test, only going by the field strength that is capable of causing EMI.

> In common equipment deployments, the

> electronics are wrapped in two layers of

> Faraday cage: the steel case of the equipment

> itself and the steel cabinet into which the

> equipment is installed, both well grounded.

> Penetration from even strong EM fields is limited.
>

I agree. Depending on the magnitude of down side, ie., to mitigate an attack to induce electrical failure (Magnetron + horn antenna), it may be necessary for metal clad walls and floor housing the electronic equipment. The thickness of metal clading would need some testing with an RF emitter discussed at https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/emp-the-suitcase-that-can-close-down-your-site/.

> Also, if you go to the expense of boring under

> someone's data center I have to think dynamite

> will be more effective at disabling it.

If all data centers without a floor beneath are hardened to repel a sub-surface horizontal drilling apparatus, that's great. For data centers that do have a floor beneath, the above said metal clading is relevant.

Your comments gives me an overall impression that data center equipment are on average adequately protected, that is good. Also, public discussion on the risk of intentional EMI is a big positive. However, targeting a human using powerful RF is uncharacterized (please see https://github.com/sureshs20/De_Risk_Technology). If the RF emitters conducive for getting re-purposed for malice were prohibitively expensive _or_ the expertise to re-purpose RF for malice was very complex _or_ if there were diagnostic/forensic tests to detect foul-play using powerful RF, I would not be pursuing this initiative to safeguard unsuspecting/defenseless targets of opportunity.

Please also note that I have been at the threshold of cancer post-overexposure to a combination of powerful RF and X-ray (re-purposed X-ray tube) during this lifetime to be committed to developing diagnostic/forensic tests and making you all aware of this in the spirit of 'fore warned is fore armed'.

Suresh

On Wednesday, November 4, 2020, William Herrin <bill@herrin.us> wrote:

On Wed, Nov 4, 2020 at 8:49 AM Suresh Kalkunte <sskalkunte@gmail.com> wrote:
> I believe the below described method of causing intentional (1) damage to equipment in data centers and (2) physical injury to a person at the workplace is on-topic for the NANOG community, if not, I look forward to your feedback. As a software developer who has subscribed to the NANOG mailing list for a number of years, I post this note relying on intellectual honesty that I have had the opportunity to observe since 1996-97.

Hello,

Did you test against common equipment deployments or did you just
measure the field strength?

In common equipment deployments, the electronics are wrapped in two
layers of Faraday cage: the steel case of the equipment itself and the
steel cabinet into which the equipment is installed, both well
grounded. Penetration from even strong EM fields is limited.

Also, if you go to the expense of boring under someone's data center I
have to think dynamite will be more effective at disabling it.

Regards,
Bill Herrin

--
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