On Wed, Jun 2, 2021 at 8:54 AM Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> wrote:
Jeroen Massar via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> writes:
For many organisations DNSSEC is 'scary' and a burden as it feels 'fragile' for them.
For "many"? Can you name one that doesn't feel like that?
https://www.arin.net/vault/announcements/2019/20190204.html
https://www.ripe.net/support/service-announcements/dnssec-validation-problem...
DNSSEC *is* scary, fragile and a burden. The question is whether the alternatives are worse.
Certainly. It's probably not even difficult. My large organization doesn't find DNSSEC 'scary' or a burden and didn't even when we started in 2011. It was simply a technical challenge that needed to be designed and integrated. We have authoritative DNSSEC signing and recursive DNSSEC validation in place. Public and internal authoritative DNS is mostly signed and validation is enforced throughout our multi-layered recursive infrastructure. A number of other organizations also do DNSSEC and have been doing it. I know our Internet email team is aware of the use of DANE for SMTP TLS and are considering it, but DNSSEC is not a factor at all in their evaluation. It's a given, just part of the DNS infrastructure they use. And I'm not aware of any "alternative" that does what DNSSEC does. The only choice is whether you care about verifiable DNS response integrity or not. As far as 'fragile' goes, I assume that would be implementation dependent. There's no inherent reason an architecture would be 'fragile'. Or if you mean failure to properly maintain your zones will break your DNS, that would be true for any strong integrity assurance mechanism that could possibly be designed. Integrity assurance means if things are supposed to be secured and cannot be validated they will not resolve. That's an underlying requirement any mechanism would have to meet or it's not providing integrity assurance. Scott