On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 11:38:04AM -0800, Owen DeLong via NANOG wrote:
> > On Dec 11, 2021, at 04:11 , Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> wrote:
...
> > https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html
> >
> > 1. upgrade log4j to 2.15.0 and restart all java apps
> > 2. start java with "-D log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true" (v2.10+ only)
> > 3. start java with "LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS=true" environment variable (v2.10+ only)
> > 4. zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class
> >
> > There's a lot of scanning going on at the moment, so if you have an exposed java instance running something which includes log4j2, you may already be compromised.
> >
> > Nick
>
> Alternatively, this incantation solved the problem on my linux server:
>
> rpm -e log4j12 ant-apache-log4j log4j


There are many software setups that bundle their own log4j.jar without
bothering to go through the OS package manager....

$ rpm -qa | fgrep log4j
$

$ find / -name log4j*jar
....system/log4j/log4j/log4j/1.2.17/log4j-1.2.17.jar

(obviously an old system due to the commands used and version found,
and nor will it get patches available because of vendor...).

Sorta like playing whack-a-mole with jquery.js (another package with
lots of security history that seems to be copied _everywhere_ without
registring it with the OS package manager).

So, the exercise becomes _finding_ the software that uses it, and then
doing the configs that defang JNDI everywhere you find it.