You can break your blocks into /24's or smaller and readvertise them to your upstreams. You can also modify local preference using community tags with most upstreams. If you have tier 1 peerings you may be able to get them to filter the bad routes if you can prove they were assigned to you by ARIN. There's no real way to get 100% of your traffic back until you get the other company to stop advertising your routes though. You may also get traction from the AS's directly connected to the problem AS. I'm not sure how quickly you can get the other AS's to act on your behalf. The short blocks and local pref should get some of your traffic back though. 2012/1/31 Kelvin Williams <kwilliams@altuscgi.com>
Greetings all.
We've been in a 12+ hour ordeal requesting that AS19181 (Cavecreek Internet Exchange) immediately filter out network blocks that are being advertised by ASAS33611 (SBJ Media, LLC) who provided to them a forged LOA.
The routes for networks: 208.110.48.0/20, 63.246.112.0/20, and 68.66.112.0/20 are registered in various IRRs all as having an origin AS 11325 (ours), and are directly allocated to us.
The malicious hijacking is being announced as /24s therefore making route selection pick them.
Our customers and services have been impaired. Does anyone have any contacts for anyone at Cavecreek that would actually take a look at ARINs WHOIS, and IRRs so the networks can be restored and our services back in operation?
Additionally, does anyone have any suggestion for mitigating in the interim? Since we can't announce as /25s and IRRs are apparently a pipe dream.
-- Kelvin Williams Sr. Service Delivery Engineer Broadband & Carrier Services Altus Communications Group, Inc.
"If you only have a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." -- Abraham Maslow