It makes you wonder why they just don't rekey and put up a different selector while deleting the compromised selector?

Yes, this is bad but it has a straightforward solution to the compromise -- unlike compromised cert signing keys, natch.

Mike

Namecheap has updated their status page item to include

"We have stopped all the emails (that includes Auth codes delivery, Trusted Devices’ verification, and Password Reset emails, etc.)"

Yikes.

On Sun, Feb 12, 2023, 3:54 PM Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:

I think that it might be appropriate to name and shame the third party, since they should know better too. It almost has the whiff of a scam.

Mike

On 2/12/23 3:49 PM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:

One very possible theory is that whoever runs the outbound marketing communications and email newsletter demanded the keys and got them, with execs overriding security experts at Namecheap who know better. 

I would sincerely hope that the people whose job titles at Namecheap include anything related to network engineering, network security or cryptography at that company do know better. Large domain registrars are not supposed to make such a rookie mistake. 

On Sun, Feb 12, 2023, 3:46 PM Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:

On 2/12/23 3:40 PM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
> https://www.namepros.com/threads/concerning-e-mail-from-namecheap.1294946/page-2#post-8839257
>
>
> https://lowendtalk.com/discussion/184391/namecheap-hacked
>
> It looks like a third party service they gave their keys to has been
> compromised. I got several phishes that fully pass as legit Namecheap
> emails.
>
> https://www.namecheap.com/status-updates/archives/74848
>
>
If they actually gave them their own private keys, they clearly don't
get how that's supposed to work with DKIM. The right thing to do is
create a new selector with the third party's signing key. Private keys
should be kept... private.

Mike