For transit maybe Cogent should have dropped the route, so they did not advertize a route to peers that included null routed parts. Den 16/02/2017 kl. 21.52 skrev Jean-Francois Mezei:
On 2017-02-16 14:59, Sadiq Saif wrote:
From - https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/02/a-court-order-blocked-pirate-sit...
Many thanks.
pardon my ignorance here, but question:
For an outfit such as Cogent which acts not only as a transit provider, but also edge provider to large end users, can it easily implement such a court order to block only edge interfaces and not to its transit infrastructure?
(aka: propagate null routes for 104.31.19.30 only to interfaces that lead to end users, but leave core/GBP aspects without the block.)
Or is BGP and any internal routing protocols so intermingled that it becomes hard to manage such blocks ?
The difficulty for network to block traffic becomes an important argument when trying to convince governments that blocking should not be done. (ex: Québec government wanting to block access to gambling sites except its own).