----- Original Message ----- From: "Joe Abley" <jabley@isc.org> To: "Randy Bush" <randy@psg.com> Cc: "Bill Woodcock" <woody@pch.net>; <nanog@merit.edu> Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2003 10:17 AM Subject: Re: Hijacked IP space.
How should your peers certify that the routes you announce are reasonable for them to receive?
Still doesn't solve the problem of ISPs announcing out hijacked blocks. It is stupidly simple to announce out blocks you don't own. A few years ago, when I was a netadmin, we on several occasions announced out blocks we had no permission to announce out (/24s). This happened on the days after 9/11 as well when we acquired customers who's ISPs didn't survive the collapse of the NYC telco network. All it took was using the BGP request form at a large unnamed Tier 1 backbone provider, and our filters were adjusted to allow us to announce out any network we wanted to. No questions asked, no authorization forms, nothing. I've confirmed this behavior with several of the backbones. Why are these backbones allowing their T1 customers to make these kind of announcements without any kind of authorization forms or simple checking to see if its a valid announcement for that customer? -------------------------- Brian Bruns The Summit Open Source Development Group Open Solutions For A Closed World / Anti-Spam Resources http://www.sosdg.org The AHBL - http://www.ahbl.org