On Jul 9, 2007, at 9:31 AM, Randy Bush wrote:
Tony Tauber wrote:
There's no magic bullet in updating BGP if a fundamental, verifiable data model is not accepted and agreed upon.
the space of routing data validation is large, we can explore it at our leisure, and we have been for some years. but my point was that it is silly to indulge in conjecturbation on the cause of the recent event and excoriate l(3), hanaro, or john curran's grandmother until we have heard from the folk who have actual data.
I can't help but conjecturbate how this might relate to route flap damping, and whether overly aggressive RFD might related to such DoS. The other side of the coin would be that RFD might also limit the extent spoofed routes. The amount of noise within the system makes it difficult for administrators to fully comprehending what happened while it is happening. A means to even partially validate routing information might provide more timely and greater insight. This insight may help rule out nefarious causes. When it doesn't, the issue might be far more serious. Crying wolf too many times is bad, but not seeing the wolf could be worse. -Doug