Practically, what this means is that the government will be asking broadband providers - as well as companies that manufacture devices used for broadband communications – to build insecure backdoors into their networks, imperiling the privacy and security of citizens on the Internet.
I'm sorry, but this is simply an unsupportable statement. What is required of routers is that the provider be able to configure the device to make copies of certain packets to a monitoring port. Assuming that the monitoring port is duly managed, how does this qualify as "insecure"?
It also hobbles technical innovation by forcing companies involved in broadband to redesign their products to meet government requirements.
As opposed to hobbling innovation by meeting customer requirements? There are many issues with CALEA that one can object to, primarily having to do with the checks necessary to ensure that appropriate warrants are obtained and that the traffic is appropriately filtered before monitoring. I'm disappointed that EFF is so off the mark here. Tony