Network Engineering != Power Grid/Generation Engineering. What you know about building a network does not apply to building a power generation and distribution system. Imagine what you might design if a large BGP flap could physically destroy a POP. A small variance in voltage or frequency can cause significant damage not only to the transmission and generation facilities, but also to end user equipment. When you lose or gain significant load on a distribution system, it causes the frequency to rise or fall. When the frequency varies significantly from 60Hz, you begin to catastrphically destroy generator sets and sensitive transmission gear. So, trip circuits are set to identify a frequency change that is significant and to trip the gen sets off-line. At this point if you don't isolate the problem, it becomes a domino efffect. The load generating capacity keeps dropping as the demand remains the same. The only option is to isolate the failed grid area, and then slowly bring the grid back on-line bit by bit. -Chris At 09:04 AM 12/9/98 -0500, Jon Zeeff wrote:
breakers on the substation. It also caused a cascade effect, tripping the Hunters Point and Potrero power plants.
grid primary power sources. Aside from the human error, the system worked "as designed to protect the rest of the grid."
I suggest that causing a cascade effect and increasing the area of an outage isn't a good way to design a system.
Chris A. Icide / chris@skycache.com VP Engineering/Operations SkyCache / www.skycache.com (v) 301-598-0500 x2235