Gentlemen and Ladies, I concur with the view expressed by Bob Fox (IANA-134), that the "current method only favours Verisign and crooks." The hijacking of panix.com, and the post-hijacking response of VGRS, which could unilaterally act, but choses not to, for its own reasons, and MelburneIT, which could unilaterally act, but choses to not act until 72 hours after being noticed, if then, is a counter-example to any claim that the current method has any rational application to domain names that are "mission critical", that is, used for something other than proping up some shoddy trademark claim by some party that doesn't even use the dns for core operational practice. It doesn't reflect very well on the registries and registrars either. Eric Brunner-Williams CTO Wampumpeag, LLC Operator, USA Webhost, IANA-439, CORE-124