On Sun, Feb 6, 2011 at 12:15 PM, Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> wrote:
On 2/6/11 8:00 AM, John Curran wrote:
On Feb 5, 2011, at 9:40 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
What's really needed is seperate the routing slot market from the address allocation market.
Bingo! In fact, having an efficient market for obtaining routing of a given prefix, combined with IPv6 vast identifier space, could actually satisfy the primary goals that we hold for a long-term scalable address architecture, and enable doing it in a highly distributed, automatable fashion:
So assuming this operates on a pollution model the victims of routing table bloat are compensated by the routing table pollutors for the use of the slots which they have to carry. so I take the marginal cost of the slots that I need subtract the royalities I recieve from the other participants and if I'm close to the mean number of slots per participant then it nets out to zero.
Hi Joel, It couldn't and wouldn't work that way. Here's how it could work: Part 1: The Promise. If paid to carry a particular route (consisting one specific network and netmask, no others) then barring a belief that a particular received route announcement is fraudulent, a given AS: A. Will announce that route to each neighbor AS which pays for Internet access if received from any neighbor AS, unless the specific neighbor AS has asked to receive a restricted set of routes. B. Will announce that route to every neighbor AS if received from any neighbor AS who pays for Internet access, unless the specific neighbor AS has asked to receive a restricted set of routes. C. Will not ask any neighbor AS to filter the given route or any superset from the list of routes offered on that connection. D. Will assure sufficient internal carriage of the route within the AS's network to reasonably meet responsibilities A, B and C, and extend the route or a sufficient covering route to every non-BGP customer of the network. Part 2: The Payment. Each AS who wishes to do so will offer to execute The Promise for any set of networks/netmasks requested by the legitimate origin AS for a reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) price selected by the AS based on reasonable estimates of the routing slot costs. The preceding not withstanding, an AS may determine that a particular route or AS is not eligible for carriage at any price due to violations of that AS's terms of service. If such is determined, the AS will not accept payment for carrying the route and will refund any payments made for service during the period in which carriage is not made. Needless to say, the origin AS with two routers can offer a RAND fee to carry routes, but not many will take them up on it. They'll have to carry the route or institute a default route if they want to remain fully connected. The folks who will get paid are the ones who collectively are the backbone where you, as the origin, can't afford for your route not to be carried. These are, of course, the same folks who are presently the victims of routing pollution who pay the lion's share of the $2B/yr routing slot costs yet have little choice but to carry the routes. Part 3: The Arbiter. One or several route payment centers collects the RAND offerings and makes them available to origin ASes in bulk sets. You write one check each month to the Arbiter and he collects your routes with his other customers and makes the appropriate Payments for the Promises. Part 4: The Covering Routes. ARIN and the other RIRs auction the rights to offer a covering route for particular /8's. The winner announces the whole /8 but gets to break the RAND rule in the Payment for covered routes. An origin AS can still choose to have everybody carry his routes. But he can also choose to have just the paid paths to the AS with the Covering Route carried, or some fraction of ASes that includes those paid paths. Or he could buy transit tunnels from the Covering Route AS anchored to PA addresses from his individual ISPs. Or he could do a mix of the two. Regardless, the origin AS ends up with full reachability without needing his explicit route to be carried the breadth of the Internet. Note that I use the term "auction" very loosely. The winner could be the qualified AS willing to pay a fixed nominal fee and promise the lowest carriage fee / 95th percentile tunnel transit fee. At any rate, you get a healthy potential for route aggregation through payment selection by the origin AS. If more precise routing is worth the money, they'll pay the slot cost. If not, they'll rely on the covers. Or if it works out that a router costs $5M because it has to carry 10M routes, who cares as long as you're being paid what it costs?
Yay?
Yay! Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin ................ herrin@dirtside.com bill@herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/> Falls Church, VA 22042-3004