Sean Donelan wrote:
192.239.92.47 is announced by NTIS's ASN 10616 via UUNET ASN 701. I could not find a valid aut-num object for ASN 10616, and the covering route object for 192.239.92.47 was an old SURANET/BBN block for 192.239/16 indicating a source AS 1.
This is reasonably typical ...
The lack of correct current routing registry information for the IRS web site doesn't seem to have hurt its connectivity. Other the other hand, it also wouldn't hurt the connectivity of someone impersonating the IRS web site network route. The rest of the Internet just has to take the routes on faith.
Don't let a route being registered in one of the routing registries lull you into a false sense of security (sic), there is zero to very little real authentication done on a route registration. It only takes an ounce (or less) knowledge to register a route as being originated from any AS. Do I think this is a real problem? It hasn't been so far, probably due to our cooperative and trusting nature >;). I think it would take quite some resources and reputation killing stupidity (or malice) to inject 'illegal' routes and then do something meaningful with them. -Steve