From Gordon Cook: To refresh folk's minds, here is what Sean said:
The principal problem is that the RSes and the whole IRR are only as good as the databases are, and the bulk of the RADB was populated from the wrong source. Rather than doing what I would consider the correct thing -- that is, watching peerings between the RSes and the providers participating in the various RS tests and tracking down all the information from the IRR based on what was seen there, verifying routing policies with end sites -- they started with the PRDB and hoped that fate would cause the RADB to become more correct.
I think that is a bit strong to say that the RA was hoping that fate would cause the RADB to become more correct. I think the RA was hoping that the community would work with the RA to correct errors in the data originally loaded into the RA. Certainly, that has been my intent as I have worked with the data for the various ASes which I watch over. My understanding of RADB and the IRR concept in general is that it should serve as a source of information, not as a reflection of observed behavior. So filling the RADB with observed data from the RSes would not be appropriate. However, having some resource that does compare observed data to the information in the RADB would be useful. This has previously been discussed at NANOG and I recall the RA team taking some interest in exploring the possible creation of such a resource.
To be brief and blunt, the RA team started with information explicitly designed to PREVENT connectivity between "bad" (evil, greedy, commercial) networks and "good" networks which would be AUP compliant. I'd think common sense would indicate doing some extra (and well paid) work to instead start off with something approaching a model of the reality of interconnectivity.
I agree that using the PRDB as the original source may have caused more harm than good. In my opinion, the only other approach would have been to start with an empty database and have the various providers fill it with their data from scratch. Would we now have a more accurate RADB? Maybe. Since that was the path not taken, we'll never know for sure. I believe that the more folks participate with data in the IRR, the likelyhood that errors in the data can be identified increases.
Moreover, another disappointment is that one could easily assert that a strong reason for using the PRDB as the source of information from day #1 was that MERIT was already spending its resources maintaining that database and toolset in a deal with ANS to keep ANS's network routing working much the same way during the many months while they figured out how to move on from the end of the NSFNET backbone service.
I am sure that the transition of ANS from the NSFNET days to the current situation involved a number of operational adjustments. I believe that anything done to help this transition go smoothly was good for everyone and not just ANS. Perhaps I am not enough of an "evil greedy bastard" (though I am an "sob" :-) to believe that ANS having problems resulting the transition is a good thing for everyone else.
In short, I think the chief failing of the RADB is not the toolset, the concept, or the long-term plan, all of which make some to alot of sense. Instead, what seems to have killed it dead is that the RA was too busy to commit the *serious* effort it would have taken to populate the RADB with information from reality in the first place.
This paragraph begs the question: Can the patient be saved? That is, if the concept, toolset and long-term plan make some to alot of sense, do we move forward by fixing the existing problems or starting over? -- Stan | Academ Consulting Services |internet: sob@academ.com Olan | For more info on academ, see this |uucp: {mcsun|amdahl}!academ!sob Barber | URL- http://www.academ.com/academ |Opinions expressed are only mine.