In this specific case the group of self-described DOD network cowboys who, due to lack of transparency and public oversight, could be doing all manner of nefarious things with this IP space. It can’t help to let it in, and it can definitely hurt.

But you know that. So why are you playing dumb?

 -mel 

On Apr 24, 2021, at 8:44 AM, Mike Hammett <nanog@ics-il.net> wrote:


"proven-malicious IP space owner"

The DoD?


From: "Mel Beckman" <mel@beckman.org>
To: "Mike Hammett" <nanog@ics-il.net>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org, "John Curran" <jcurran@arin.net>
Sent: Saturday, April 24, 2021 10:37:42 AM
Subject: Re: DoD IP Space

I will not permit traffic into my network whose proven-malicious IP space owner is devious about its purpose. You can, if you want.

 -mel 

On Apr 24, 2021, at 8:28 AM, Mike Hammett <nanog@ics-il.net> wrote:


Huh?


From: "Mel Beckman" <mel@beckman.org>
To: "John Curran" <jcurran@arin.net>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Saturday, April 24, 2021 10:24:45 AM
Subject: Re: DoD IP Space

This doesn’t sound good, no matter how you slice it. The lack of transparency with a civilian resource is troubling at a minimum. I’m going to bogon this space as a defensive measure, until its real — and detailed — purpose can be known. The secret places of our government have proven themselves untrustworthy in the protection of citizens’ data and networks. They tend to think they know “what’s good for” us.

 -mel

On Apr 24, 2021, at 8:05 AM, John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:



FYI,
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers

On Jan 20, 2021, at 8:35 AM, John Curran <jcurran@istaff.org> wrote:


Tom –

Most definitely: lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause.  

Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations.

/John 

On Nov 5, 2019, at 10:38 AM, Tom Beecher <beecher@beecher.cc> wrote:


Using the generally accepted definition of a bogon ( RFC 1918 / 5735 / 6598 + netblock not allocated by an RiR ), 22/8 is not a bogon and shouldn't be treated as one. 

The DoD does not announce it to the DFZ, as is their choice, but nothing says they may not change that position tomorrow. There are plenty of subnets out there that are properly allocated by an RiR, but the assignees do not send them to the DFZ because of $reasons. 

In my opinion, creating bogon lists that include allocated but not advertised prefixes is poor practice that is likely to end up biting an operator at one point or another.

On Tue, Nov 5, 2019 at 9:45 AM Töma Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com> wrote:
Peace,

On Tue, Nov 5, 2019, 4:55 PM David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> wrote:
> On Nov 4, 2019, at 10:56 PM, Grant Taylor via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:
>> This thread got me to wondering, is there any
>> legitimate reason to see 22/8 on the public
>> Internet?  Or would it be okay to treat 22/8
>> like a Bogon and drop it at the network edge?
>
> Given the transfer market for IPv4 addresses,
> the spot price for IPv4 addresses, and the need
> of even governments to find “free” (as in
> unconstrained) money, I’d think treating any
> legacy /8 as a bogon would not be prudent.

It has been said before in this thread that the DoD actively uses this
network internally.  I believe if the DoD were to cut costs, they
would be able to do it much more effectively in many other areas, and
their IPv4 networks would be about the last thing they would think of
(along with switching off ACs Bernard Ebbers-style).  With that in
mind, treating the DoD networks as bogons now makes total sense to me.

--
Töma