BBN has also released an initial version of their relying party software. Core features are basically the same as the other validators (namely, RPKI certificate validation), with -- more fine-grained error diagnostics and -- more robust support for the RTR protocol for distributing validated information to routers. <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg03854.html> On Fri, Jan 20, 2012 at 9:39 AM, Alex Band <alexb@ripe.net> wrote:
If you want to play around with RPKI Origin Validation, you can download the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator here: http://ripe.net/certification/tools-and-resources It's simple to set up and use: just unzip the package on a *NIX system, run ./bin/rpki-validator and browse to http://localhost:8080
EuroTransit have a public one running here: http://rpki01.fra2.de.euro-transit.net:8080/
You can see it's pointing to several Trust Anchors, downloads and validates all ROA periodically, you can apply ignore filters and white lists, see a BGP announcement validity preview based on route collector data, integrates with existing (RPSL based) workflows and can talk to RPKI-capable routers.
If you want to get an idea of how an RPKI-capable router would be configured, here's some sample config for Cisco and Juniper: http://www.ripe.net/certification/router-configuration
You can also log into a public RPKI-capable Juniper here: 193.34.50.25, 193.34.50.26 telnet username: rpki password: testbed
With additional documentation available here: http://rpki01.fra2.de.euro-transit.net/documentation.html
Have fun,
Alex
On 20 Jan 2012, at 13:08, Arturo Servin wrote:
You could use RPKI and origin validation as well.
We have an application that does that.
http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/
For example you can periodically check if your prefix is valid:
http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/valid/cidr/200.7.84....
If it were invalid for a possible hijack it would look like:
http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/invalid/cidr/200.31....
Or you can just query for any state:
http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/all/cidr/200.31.12.0...
Regards, as
On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:47, Yang Xiang wrote:
Hi,
I build a system ‘Argus’ to real-timely alert prefix hijackings. Argus monitors the Internet and discovers anomaly BGP updates which caused by prefix hijacking. When Argus discovers a potential prefix hijacking, it will advertise it in a very short time, both in our website (http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn) and the mailing list (argus@csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn).
Argus has been running in the Internet for more than eight months, it usually can discover potential prefix hijackings in ten seconds after the first anomaly BGP update announced. Several hijacking alarms have been confirmed by network operators. For example: http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/fingerprints/61544/ has been confirmed by the network operators of AS23910 and AS4538, it was a prefix hijacking caused by a mis-configuration of route filter.
If you are interest in BGP security, welcome to visit our website and subscribe the mailing list. If you are interest in the system itself, you can find our paper which published in ICNP 2011 (FIST workshop) http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=6089080.
Hope Argus will be useful for you. _________________________________ Yang Xiang . about.me/xiangyang Ph.D candidate. Tsinghua University Argus: argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn