jra@baylink.com ("Jay R. Ashworth") writes:
[ unthreaded to encourage discussion ]
On Sat, Jul 26, 2008 at 04:55:23PM -0500, James Hess wrote:
Nameservers could incorporate poison detection...
Listen on 200 random fake ports (in addition to the true query ports); if a response ever arrives at a fake port, then it must be an attack, read the "identified" attack packet, log the attack event, mark the RRs mentioned in the packet as "poison being attempted" for 6 hours; for such domains always request and collect _two_ good responses (instead of one), with a 60 second timeout, before caching a lookup.
The attacker must now guess nearly 64-bits in a short amount of time, to be successful. Once a good lookup is received, discard the normal TTL and hold the good answer cached and immutable, for 6 hours (_then_ start decreasing the TTL normally).
Is there any reason which I'm too far down the food chain to see why that's not a fantastic idea? Or at least, something inspired by it?
at first glance, this is brilliant, though with some unimportant nits. however, since it is off-topic for nanog, i'm going to forward it to the namedroppers@ops.ietf.org mailing list and make detailed comments there. -- Paul Vixie -- This message has been scanned for viruses and dangerous content by MailScanner, and is believed to be clean.