Short Disclaimer: I frequently use the PEERING testbed myself, so I'm genuinely interested in where and why people draw the boundary of what's fine and what's not. Iirc., the route collectors see a (drastically varying) number of poisoned routes (assuming everything within a loop is poisoning) in the DFZ at any point in time, affecting a (drastically varying) number of ASNs, prefixes, and paths. So why would you expect this experiment to be noticeable at all---I mean, compared to the day-to-day, "1% of the Internet is beyond broken and does Yolo things" noise? Very similar experiments have run in the past (e.g., [1] in 2018); did you notice them? Would poisoning be tolerated if the PEERING testbed would be, e.g., some security-obsessed org that wants to avoid that your infrastructure touches any of its precious packets during the forwarding process? I guess what I want to figure out is: Is it the intention behind the poisoning experiments that bothers people or is the act of poisoning itself? Kind regards, Lars [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03716.pdf On 02.05.22 16:33, Raymond Dijkxhoorn via NANOG wrote:
Hi!
If I am interpreting this correctly that you are just going to yolo a bunch of random ASNs to poison paths with, perhaps you should consider getting explicit permission for the ASNs you want to use instead.
A lot of operators monitor the DFZ for prefixes with their ASN in the path, and wouldn't appreciate random support tickets because their NOC got some alert. :)
Exatly that. How about you ask people to OPT-IN instead of you wanting people to OPT-OUT of whatever experiment you feel you need to do with other people's resources.
When you the last time you asked the entire internet?s permission to announce routes ?
I dont exactly understand what you try to say its not about the route its about the path.
If the insert 'my ASN' i certainly will complain wherever i can and no i will not opt out from that. I will assume they just do use my ASN. Weird thought?
Bye, Raymond