As it turns out, both 2008 and 3300 are Infonet, US and Europe. So this was their foo. The problem is obviously that the RFC-proscribed behavior with bad prefixes works on paper, as it serves to isolate the network originating the problem prefix. However, that is totally dependent on /every/ router doing so, thus preventing the problem from spreading, which as we discovered, does not happen. The ideal alternative behavior is to drop the bad prefix--not dropping the peer, but not passing the bad prefix along either. I've been told that there are recent Cisco IOS revs that do this instead of passing it along, but they have other unresolved bugs that prevent their widespread use. Should someone think about possibly updating the RFC? -Chris On Tue, Oct 09, 2001 at 12:12:24PM -0400, Christopher A. Woodfield wrote:
the problem path was not 3, it was '3300 (64603) 2008'. I'm presuming that the leaking conferation was within AS3300's network.
aut-num: AS3300 as-name: AUCS descr: AUCS Communications Services v.o.f. descr: aka Infonet-Europe descr: The Netherlands
-Chris
On Tue, Oct 09, 2001 at 06:02:26PM +0200, Rafi Sadowsky wrote:
On Mon, 8 Oct 2001, abha wrote:
Did a lot of folks get affected by this? Any news on what caused the bogus path?
Anyone have contacts at 2008?
(transit ASes deleted) ?3?64603? 2008
-abha ;) (an inquiring mind who wants to know... *grin*)
AS3 is MIT what is the relevance to this problem ?
AS64603 is in "reserved"(private) AS space ( 64512 - 65535 ) IMHO could be an internal confederation leaking - any better ideas ?
- Rafi
-- --------------------------- Christopher A. Woodfield rekoil@semihuman.com
PGP Public Key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB887618B
-- --------------------------- Christopher A. Woodfield rekoil@semihuman.com PGP Public Key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB887618B