Seems like submitting a fraud request to ARIN is more effective than writing a novel and sending it to NANOG, and doesn't require the latter... On Mon, Aug 12, 2019, 3:16 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:
On 9 Aug 2019, at 4:09 PM, Ronald F. Guilmette <rfg@tristatelogic.com> wrote:
... Unfortunately, we cannot read too much into this change that was made to the block's public-facing WHOIS record. Neither the new WHOIS info nor even the old WHOIS info can be used to reliably infer who or what is the legitimate registrant of the block at any point in time. This is because ARIN, like all of the other Regional Internet Registries, allows registrants to put essentially any bovine excrement they desire into their public-facing WHOIS records.
Ronald -
That is not the case – ARIN confirms the legal status of organizations receiving number resources.
(And, it should be noted, the man behind the recent large scale "Micfo" fraud apparently availed himself of this exact opportunity far subterfuge, in spades.)
As previously noted on this list, such was only possible because of the use of falsely notarized documents.
Regardless, the available records suggest that there are only two likely possibilities in this case:
1) On or about 02-17-2010 HHSI, Inc. (California) transfered the registration of the 216.179.128.0/17 block from itself to the 2009 vintage Delaware entity Azuki, LLC. If this is what happened, then it is likely that the transfer was performed in violation of the applicable ARIN trasfer policy that was in force at the time. (Azuki, LLC did not simply buy-out HHSI, Inc., lock, stock, and barrel in 2010. California records show that HHSI, Inc. continued to be an active California corporation until at least 02/12/2014, and probably well beyond that date.)
2) Alternatively, on or about 02-17-2010 HHSI, Inc. (California) simply altered what would henceforth appear in the public-facing WHOIS record for the the 216.179.128.0/17 block to make it appear... to everyone except ARIN staff, who knew better... that the block was now registered to Azuki, LLC in Delaware.
Only ARIN staff can tell us which of these possibilities actually applies. But due to ARIN's strict adherence to contractual confidentiality with respect to all of their resource holders, I do not anticipate that ARIN will actually provide any clarity on this case anytime soon.
That is easy to address: submit a fraud request, and it will be reviewed and corrected if it was done fraudulently.
Thanks! /John
John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers