Lancheng, thanks for your comment. 

About ProConi (and ASPA): so, we're aware it's more challenging than ASPA and have evaluated the effort required - it actually doesn't seem too bad, although that doesn't mean that it'll be cost effective to use it. But as I've mentioned in an earlier email to this list, Joel Halpern (cc:ed) has alerted us to an even larger problem with ProConi; the proconi list of a given AS may become incorrect due to certain changes in AS relationships, leading to possible false-positives for possibly significant time. This is obviously very problematic and we are editing this part of the paper to reflect this risk. Probably, this mechanism should not be deployed; luckily, we obtained good results also with the other defenses against leakage in the paper, for the practical case of non-eavesdropping adversary. In any case we see the work as the opening point, or another step, toward more effective defenses against path manipulations and intentional route leaks. More work should be done. 

We look forward to meeting you in NDSS; I haven't yet seen list of accepted papers, and it'll be great if you can share your paper. But if not, then we'll see it in the conference :) 

best, Amir
--
Amir Herzberg

Comcast professor of Security Innovations, Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut
`Applied Introduction to Cryptography' textbook and lectures:https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/cybersecurity




On Mon, Nov 20, 2023 at 5:30 AM Lancheng Qin <qlc19@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn> wrote:

Hi Amir,

 

I really enjoy reading this paper, and I’m interested in your design of preventing attribute manipulations and route leaks.

 

I think BGP-iSec is useful under a Global Attacker. But I have some concerns about using ProConIP-list under a Full Attacker (in Sec. III-B). Using ProConIP-list requires the origin AS clearly knows its provider cone, which is challenging in practice. Although we can use CAIDA topology to infer the provider cone of an AS, some provider-customer relationships may not be discovered by CAIDA topology or other existing AS relationship inference algorithms. If the ProConIP-list is not accurate or complete (i.e., covering all BGP-iSec-adopting ASes in the provider cone), it may cause legitimate BGP announcements to be dropped. Compared to publishing the whole provider cone, ASPA requires an AS to publish its provider ASes, which is easier and more feasible. Can we use BGP-iSec and ASPA together? Would that be more beneficial?

 

BTW, I will also present my new work on routing security in NDSS’2024. Looking forward to discussing more with you in San Diego:)

 

Best,

Lancheng Qin






-----原始邮件-----
发件人: "Amir Herzberg" <amir.lists@gmail.com>
发送时间: 2023-11-11 07:02:48 (星期六)
收件人: NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
主题: BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV Attacks

Hi NANOGers,


We will present our new work, titled: `BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV Attacks', in NDSS'24.


If you're interested in security of Internet routing (BGP), and want a copy, see URL below, drop me a message/email - or see us in the conference - or just read the final version.


Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375553362_BGP-iSec_Improved_Security_of_Internet_Routing_Against_Post-ROV_Attacks

--
Amir Herzberg

Comcast professor of Security Innovations, Computer Science and Engineering, University of Connecticut
`Applied Introduction to Cryptography' textbook and lectures:https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/cybersecurity