On 6/13/10 1:11 PM, Seth Mattinen wrote:
On 6/13/10 9:35 AM, Larry Sheldon wrote:
How about the case where the master zone file has be amputated and the secondaries can no longer get updates?
We just saw that with Haiti.
This overlooks the consequences of that particular catastrophic event on locally routed, and indifferently named resources, within the area directly affected by the event. The hard, even desperate struggle, to keep the physical level infrastructure powered, and operate link and above level services, using pre-event and ad hoc post-event resource to address mappings was not an exercise staged to demonstrate server configuration errors (these happen quite frequently, and without casualties) or network partition events (these too happen quite frequently, also without casualties). The Lieberman, Collins (R-ME) and Carper bill, like the Rockefeller and Snowe (R-ME) bill, offers nothing to the repair, or proactive resilience of the Haitian network. I am content that Congresswoman Chellie Pingree, of Maine's 1st CD, assisted significantly in the effort to keep the Boutillier facility fueled in the last weeks of January. Network infrastructure security can be distinguished from cybersecurity in the first instance by actual existence. Eric