I don't see non-transit ASN leakage as any greater issue than current private ASN leakage. However, I do see the ability to use non-transit ASNs to multihome end sites with provider independent addresses and allow better aggregation as a good thing. In this case, leakage would only have the same consequences as doing things the way we do them now. I don't see a real downside. Owen --On Friday, December 3, 2004 18:08 -0500 Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
On Fri, 03 Dec 2004 16:36:39 CST, John Dupuy said:
Along these lines, one could leave the transit AS networks alone if a parallel 16 bit ASN space were created. Essentially, any non-transit network would have it's non-public ASN retranslated NAT-style by upstream transit network border routers. Only the border routers would have to be changed. They would have to differentiate between public ASN X and non-public ASN X (same number) based on the which side of the router the ASN was learned from.
So given the lack of trouble with NAT sites leaking rfc1918 addresses, you foresee no problems with sites accidentally leaking the non-public ASN's, right?
-- If this message was not signed with gpg key 0FE2AA3D, it's probably a forgery.