On Feb 24, 2012, at 2:26 14PM, Danny McPherson wrote:
On Feb 24, 2012, at 1:10 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
But just because we can't solve the whole problem, does that mean we shouldn't solve any of it?
Nope, we most certainly should decompose the problem into addressable elements, that's core to engineering and operations.
However, simply because the currently envisaged solution doesn't solve this problem doesn't mean we shouldn't acknowledge it exists.
The IETF's BGP security threats document [1] "describes a threat model for BGP path security", which constrains itself to the carefully worded SIDR WG charter, which addresses route origin authorization and AS_PATH "semantics" -- i.e., this "leak" problem is expressly out of scope of a threats document discussing BGP path security - eh?
How the heck we can talk about BGP path security and not consider this incident a threat is beyond me, particularly when it happens by accident all the time. How we can justify putting all that BGPSEC and RPKI machinery in place and not address this "leak" issue somewhere in the mix is, err.., telling.
I repeat -- we're in violent agreement that route leaks are a serious problem. No one involved in BGPSEC -- not me, not Randy, not anyone -- disagrees. Give us an actionable definition and we'll try to build a defense. Right now, we have nothing better than what Justice Potter Stewart once said in an opinion: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it..." Again -- *please* give us a definition. --Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb P.S. It was routing problems, including leaks between RIP and either EIGRP or OSPF (it's been >20 years; I just don't remember), that got me involved in Internet security in the first place. I really do understand the issue.