At 08:14 PM 1/9/2003 -0800, Randy Bush wrote:
Well, first I think we need to agree that there are two different cases here: 1) interconnecting IXes operated by the same party, vs. 2) interconnecting IXes operated by different parties.
In the first case an IX operator can shoot himself in the foot, but there is only one gun and one person, so you can easily figure out why the foot hurts.
well, now we know you have ever had to debug a large L2 disaster
In the first case an IX operator can shoot himself in the foot, but there is only >one gun and one person, so you can easily figure out why the foot hurts. In the latter case, there are more people with more guns. Without
Randy - You snipped out what I said out of context. Below is the complete paragraph (and admittedly I should have said "relatively easily" rather than "easily".) The point is that I don't think we are talking about interconnecting switches operated by different parties, and I think you would agree that if it is difficult diagnosing problems with a single large scale l2 fabric, it is even more difficult with multiple administrative domains. That was the point. Original Paragraph: perfect >information distributed among the operators, this is clearly a more dangerous >situation and diagnosing/repairing is more difficult and time intensive. I believe >we are really talking about the first case. Woody - I'd still like to hear about the failures "in every prior instance".
clearly, interconnecting their exchange points to create a richly- connected Internet 'core' is a natural progression if their customers don't complain too loudly. not that it's a bad long-term plan...
Actually, it is. It's failed in every prior instance.
Thanks.