PSINet recently announced free private peering for any ISP buying transit. How might this affect the frequency of AS8584-type problems? Bill Goldstein Senior Internet Specialist AT&T wgoldstein@att.com TEL:(412)642-7288 ---------- From: jprovo Sent: Thursday, April 09, 1998 10:44 PM To: nanog Cc: jprovo Subject: Re: AS8584 taking over the internet Received: from speedy1.bns.att.com (speedy1.bns.att.com [135.177.97.230]) by pawayn01.bns.att.com (8.8.6/1.3) with ESMTP id WAA13155 for <Goldstein_William/bcs_pawayn01@pawayn01.bns.att.com>; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:53:16 -0400 (EDT) Received: from kcig1.att.att.com (kcig1.att.att.com [135.38.78.194]) by speedy1.bns.att.com (8.7.3/2.5) with ESMTP id VAA18513 for <goldstein_william@bns.att.com>; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 21:54:41 -0500 (EST) Received: (from nuucp@localhost) by kcig1.att.att.com (AT&T/GW-1.0) id VAA14235; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 21:53:11 -0500 (CDT)
Received: by kcgw1.att.com; Thu Apr 9 21:53 CDT 1998 Received: by kcgw1.att.com; Thu Apr 9 21:53 CDT 1998 Received: from localhost (daemon@localhost) by merit.edu (8.8.7/8.8.5) with SMTP id WAA26613; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:46:55 -0400 (EDT) Received: by merit.edu (bulk_mailer v1.5); Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:44:57 -0400 Received: (from majordom@localhost) by merit.edu (8.8.7/8.8.5) id WAA26537 for nanog-outgoing; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:44:56 -0400 (EDT) Received: from strato-fe0.ultra.net (strato-fe0.ultra.net [146.115.8.190]) by merit.edu (8.8.7/8.8.5) with ESMTP id WAA26533 for <nanog@merit.org>; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:44:52 -0400 (EDT) Received: from noc.ultra.net (noc.ultra.net [199.232.56.9]) by strato-fe0.ultra.net (8.8.8/ult.n14767) with ESMTP id WAA07955 for <nanog@merit.org>; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:44:51 -0400 (EDT) Received: (from jprovo@localhost) by noc.ultra.net (8.8.5/8.6.9/0.2jzp) id WAA12336 for nanog@merit.org; Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:44:50 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 9 Apr 1998 22:44:50 -0400 (EDT) From: Joe Provo - Network Architect <jprovo@ultra.net> Message-Id: <199804100244.WAA12336@noc.ultra.net> To: nanog@merit.org Subject: Re: AS8584 taking over the internet Sender: owner-nanog@merit.edu Content-Type: text
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I believe that the implication was that: 1) they're not directly connected to any of the major _US_ backbones, and 2) they're on the other end of a fairly thin hose.
And they can _still_ hose things this badly.
This speaks not well of the architecture involved.
No, no, it speaks _well_ for the architecture - equal opportunity hosage! There is no backone-hasage cabale; all that enter into bgp relationships can have a shot at hurting the net... ObContent: - yes, filters are Good. customers, especially if new to complicated things, should have both as-path and prefix filters placed against them. the questions to ask oneself regarding peers is "how clueful are they, really? and do their procedures allow only these clueful into the boxes? am I willing to tie my performance/reliability/ reputation to theirs in this intimate a fashion? are my bosses willing to do so? " People like to think in terms of the first question, not the last two. - yes, the IRR is good (and yes, their PGP implementation works); giving third parties the ability to verify your organization's "routing intent" cannot be construed as bad -- the data is publicly visible. there's nothing to hide. - yes, filtering doesn't mean not pushing IRR (or other forms of distributed data) on folks. IRR (or ...) doesn't mean not trying to more closely tie authentication/verification vs realtime; present tools are config-only, which aren't dynamic enough for the real net. joe -30-