On Tue, 13 Nov 2018 at 12:37, Mark Tinka <mark.tinka@seacom.mu> wrote:
Main reasons: - Doesn't run over IP.
Why is this upside? I've seen on two platforms (7600, MX) ISIS punted on routers running ISIS without interface having ISIS. With no ability to limit it, so any connected interface can DoS device with trivial pps rate, if ISIS is being ran. Are you testing this vector? Also, no one really understands how 802.3+CLNS interact with ISIS. It's probably globally dozen people, all open source implementations seem to copy from early Zebra implementation. And implementations are opportunistic, just enough to make it work, not actually enough to be standard compliant 802.3+CLNS. Just question of what is ES-IS role in all this, gives debates with subject matter experts. To me this is downside, I'd rather have ISIS run over EthernetII and IP. But at that point, why bother, why not just kill it and run OSPF3. I'm paying vendor to implement and maintain both protocols, and there does not seem to have good justification for both to exist. Disclaimer: all networks I've operated have been ISIS networks, and I'll continue using ISIS, not because I think it is better, but because I think the codebase gets more exposure in networks like the on I need to run. -- ++ytti