On Mon, Aug 05, 2002 at 12:03:18PM -0400, bdragon@gweep.net wrote:
Filtering piddly stuff like this without consultation is usually unwelcome at best, and a disruption at worst. It is also a serious investment of time and acl resources which could be better spent somewhere else. And lastly, it sets a bad precedent for what ISPs "can" do to proactively filter. After all, if we "can" do this, why can't we also filter illegal MP3 exchanges too.
One is envelope, the other is payload.
Until there is some technical means of "return to sender" for IP, filtering bad envelopes is the next best thing.
They are exactly the same. In the first example you filter based on udp port 53 source rfc1918 and perhaps dest rootservers, and hope you're only hitting bad traffic, but you don't really know that the payload is DNS. You can also filter mp3 exchanging services by header information and most likely hit only them too. Poking into anything other than dst ip or src/dest/port flows without reason is an intrusion IMHO. Of course in the example Stephen gave, RPF filters on the customer would have likely solved the problem quite nicely. That is the only kind of filtering which should be done on customers by default. -- Richard A Steenbergen <ras@e-gerbil.net> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)