An "Internet variable speed limit" is a nice idea, but there are some serious trust issues; applications have to trust the network implicitly not to issue gratuitous slow down messages, and certainly not to use them for evil purposes (not that I want to start a network neutrality flamewar...but what with the AT&T/Pearl Jam row, it's not hard to see rightsholders/telcos/government/alien space bats leaning on your upstream to spoil your access to content X). Further, you're going to need *very good* filtration; necessary to verify the source of any such packets closely due to the major DOS potential. Scenario: Bad Guy controls some hacked machines on AS666 DubiousNet, who peer at AMS-IX. Bad Guy has his bots inject a mass of "slow down!" packets with a faked source address taken from the IX's netblock...and everything starts moving Very Slowly. Especially if the suggestion upthread that the slowdown ought to be implemented 1-2 AS away from the problem is implemented, which would require forwarding the slowdowns between networks. It has some similarities with the Chinese firewall's use of quick TCP RSTs to keep users from seeing Bad Things; in that you could tell your machine to ignore'em. There's a sort of tragedy of the commons problem - if everyone agrees to listen to the slowdown requests, it will work, but all you need is a significant minority of the irresponsible, and there'll be no gain in listening to them.