2012/1/20 Arturo Servin <aservin@lacnic.net>
On 20 Jan 2012, at 10:38, Yang Xiang wrote:
RPKI is great.
But, firstly, ROA doesn't cover all the prefixes now, we need an alternative service to alert hijackings.
Or to sign your prefixes.
Sign prefixes is the best way. Before sign all prefixes, it is better if we have a detection service.
secondly, ROA can only secure the 'Origin AS' of a prefix,
That's true.
while Argus can discover potential hijackings caused by anomalous AS path.
Can you explain how?
Only a imprecisely detection. Section III.C in our paper http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/static/Argus.FIST11.pdf A brief explanation is: If an anomalous AS path hijacked a prefix, I can get replies in normal route-server, and can not get reply in abnormal route-servers. Here we only consider hijackings that black-hole the prefix. If a hijacking doesn't black-hole the prefix (i.e., redirect, interception, ...), is hard to detect :( I think network operators are only careless, but not trust-less, so black-hole hijacking is the majority case.
After ROA and BGPsec deployed in the entire Internet (or, in all of your
network),
Argus will stop the service :)
I was just suggesting to add a more deterministic way to detecting hijacks.
Sorry for my poor English :( What I want to say is, RPKI is really good, Argus is just an alternative, before we can protect ourself using signatures, honestly :-) Best regards!
Regards, as
-- _________________________________________ Yang Xiang. Ph.D candidate. Tsinghua University Argus: argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn
-- _________________________________________ Yang Xiang. Ph.D candidate. Tsinghua University Argus: argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn