At 01:49 AM 02-05-02 +0100, Avleen Vig wrote:
As time goes by, tools are being developed (in fact they're used now) that completely randomize the TCP or UDP ports attacked, or use a variety of icmp types in the attack. So cuurrently the only way you can 'block' such attacks is to block all packets for the offending protocol as far upstream as you possibly can, but this is not ideal.
If you're being attacked by a SYN flood, you can ask try to rate-limit the flood at your border (possible on Cisco IOS 12.0 and higher, and probably other routers too?)
ACLs have been a good tool for the past number of years to stop DOS attacks but they suffer one very bad feature - they throw away the good packets along with the bad packets. The same goes for CAR. The same goes for taking a /32 and null routing it. Consider Amazon being hit with a DDOS attack from random spoofed IPs to their web site. You can't block on source IP since it is random. If you block on destination IP - you end up taking Amazon off the network (the ultimate aim of the attacker) at a daily revenue loss of over $1M. Therefore, the solutions in the future will be mechanisms that can filter and sieve the bad packets out and let the good packets thru. Disclosure: I consult to an anti-DDOS company with this philosophy. Hank Consultant Riverhead Networks (formerly Wanwall Networks) www.riverhead.com
If you're being smurfed, you can block ICMP Echo Reply's inbound to the target IP.
It all depends on the TYPE of attack.
Having said that, it's only a matter of time before somebody releases a tool that saturates a line by spooofing the source, randomizing the protocol, and ports, and maybe even atacking other hosts on the same subnet, etc etc.
The only thing you can try and do is work with your upstream provider and try to trace the source of the attacks back, but that's incredibly difficult.
As a side note, does anyone know the status of the ICMP Traceback proposal? The ieft draft expired yesterday: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-itrace-01.txt