all, we (renesys) saw as23456 adjacent to both 1221 (expected) and 65001 (not), originating two prefixes: 203.10.62.0/24 and 203.10.63.0/24 paths looked like: <peer> 7474 1221 65001 23456 23456 23456 and many similar but also <peer> ... 4637 1221 23456 and many similar was the leak of the 65001 as intentional and part of the experiment, a simple, error, or is there something useful to learn about the difficulties of building filter lists with 4 byte ases? t. On Thu, Jan 11, 2007 at 08:14:14PM +1100, Geoff Huston wrote:
# bgpctl show rib 203.10.62.0/24 flags: * = Valid, > = Selected, I = via IBGP, A = Announced origin: i = IGP, e = EGP, ? = Incomplete
flags destination gateway lpref med aspath origin *> 203.10.62.0/24 147.28.0.1 100 0 0.3130 0.1239 0.4637 0.4637 0.4637 0.4637 0.4637 0.4637 0.1221 1.202 i
George Michaelson, Randy Bush and myself have successfully tested the implementation of 4Byte AS BGP on a public Internet transit. The above BGP RIB snapshot was taken at a 4Byte BGP speaker in North America, showing a transit path across AS 1221, AS 4637, AS 1239 and AS 3130 , with correct reconstruction of the originating AS at the other (4Byte AS) end.
The code base used was OpenBGPD, with 4 byte patches that I've added to the code in the past couple of weeks.
(Patched versions of openbgpd to include 4-byte AS support can be found at http://www.potaroo.net/tools/bgpd/)
cheers,
Geoff
-- _____________________________________________________________________ todd underwood +1 603 643 9300 x101 renesys corporation vp operations and professional svcs todd@renesys.com http://www.renesys.com/blog/todd.shtml