In message <CAF-Wqd5sO0x5muw6uPDxMXd+h1ebCCtL9Ke9uMEc7k364OfHLA@mail.gmail.com>, Ken Matlock writes:
As a relative 'outsider' I see a lot of finger-pointing and phrasing this as (effectively) someone else's fault.
To me this is a failing on a number of levels all contributing to the problem.
1) The manufacturer - Backdoors, hidden accounts, remote access capabilities, no proper security testing. No enforcing of security updates. 2) The end-user - No initiative on the end-user's perspective to gain even a basic understanding of how the device works, connects, etc. Also no tools or understanding of how to recognize *which* of their many devices on the network might be compromised and participating in the botnet. (Only indication they get is maybe their internet is slow) 3) The service providers - No effective monitoring of outgoing traffic from the end users to identify botnets and DDoS in a real-time fashion
I contend that all 3 levels have failed in this, and nothing has fundamentally changed (today it's IoT, before it was unpatched windows boxes, etc) in decades. We keep talking about the problem but very little actual action has occurred to *fix* the underlying issues.
Actually things have changed a lot in a positive direction. * Router manufactures are using device specific passwords. * Microsoft, Apple, Linux and *BSD issue regular fixes for their products and users do intall them. * My smart TV has automatic updates available and turned on. * Other products do the same. Now not everyone does this sort of thing yet, but we have examples and things don't blow up in the user's face very often. Even in the case the manufacture has tried to do the right thing. The problem had been identified and a fix issued. Now could this have been automated, yes. But it does show that what is required is getting through to manufactures and they are trying to reduce the problem. We need manufactures to have a working system to accept problem reports. We need manufactures to issue fixes to their products once they have been reported. This needs to happen for the entire expected lifetime of a product. We need the ability to have a third parties fix problems if a manufacture won't / is too slow. Getting this may require legislation changes. This may require manufactures to publish expected product lifetimes.
- Manufacturers need to be held accountable for devices that go on the internet (that includes *anything* that's connected. PCs, servers, routers, IoT devices, etc) - End users need to have ways to easily see what's going on over their local networks, to see botnet-like activity and DDoS participation (among other things) in a more real-time fashion - Service providers need to be much more proactive in watching for threats and identifying/blocking them at the source, not allowing the traffic to flow to your peers and making it someone else's problem. Right now there's a financial disincentive to doing this, in both real costs (standing up monitoring gear/etc), and imagined (my ISP is SPYING on me!).
Until we fix all 3 of these main issues we're just going to keep going in the same set of circles we do every time a 'new' threat/vector comes in.
Now, are these issues *easy*? Oh, heck no! Are they *cheap*? Once again, heck no! But to 'fix' this issue it will take all 3 levels being fixed.
If we continue to keep pointing fingers at "the other guy" as the root of the problem we're inviting external forces (Legislation) to step in and 'fix' the problem for us (and it will just make it worse).
My 2 cents (adjust for inflation) Ken
On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 1:40 PM, jim deleskie <deleskie@gmail.com> wrote:
So device is certified, bug is found 2 years later. How does this help. The info to date is last week's issue was patched by the vendor in Sept 2015, I believe is what I read. We know bugs will creep in, (source anyon= e that has worked with code forever) Also certification assuming it would work, in what country, would I need one, per country I sell into? These are not the solutions you are looking for ( Jedi word play on purpose)
On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 3:53 PM, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ < jordi.palet@consulintel.es> wrote:
Exactly, I was arguing exactly the same with some folks this week durin= g the RIPE meeting.
The same way that certifications are needed to avoid radio interference= s, etc., and if you don=E2=80=99t pass those certifications, you can=E2=80= =99t sell the products in some countries (or regions in case of EU for example), authorities should make sure that those certifications have a broader scope, including security and probably some other features to ensure th= at in case something is discovered in the future, they can be updated.
Yes, that means cost, but a few thousand dollars of certification price increase, among thousands of millions of devices of the same model bein= g manufactured, means a few cents for each unit.
Even if we speak about 1 dollar per each product being sold, it is much cheaper than the cost of not doing it and paying for damages, human resources, etc., when there is a security breach.
Regards, Jordi
-----Mensaje original----- De: NANOG <nanog-bounces@nanog.org> en nombre de Leo Bicknell < bicknell@ufp.org> Organizaci=C3=B3n: United Federation of Planets Responder a: <bicknell@ufp.org> Fecha: mi=C3=A9rcoles, 26 de octubre de 2016, 19:19 Para: <nanog@nanog.org> Asunto: Re: Spitballing IoT Security
In a message written on Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 08:06:34AM -0400, Rich Kulawiec wrote: > The makers of IoT devices are falling all over themselves to rush products > to market as quickly as possible in order to maximize their profits. They > have no time for security. They don't concern themselves with privacy > implications. They don't run networks so they don't care about t= he impact > their devices may have on them. They don't care about liability: many of > them are effectively immune because suing them would mean trans-national > litigation, which is tedious and expensive. (And even if they lost: > they'd dissolve and reconstitute as another company the next day.= ) > They don't even care about each other -- I'm pretty sure we're rapidly > approaching the point where toasters will be used to attack garag= e door > openers and washing machines.
You are correct.
I believe the answer is to have some sort of test scheme (UL Labratories?) for basic security and updateability. Then federal legislation is passed requiring any product being imported into the country to be certified, or it is refused.
Now when they rush to market and don't get certified they get $0 and go out of business. Products are stopped at the boader, every shipment is reviewed by authorities, and there is no cross boarder suing issue.
Really it's product safety 101. UL, the CPSC, NHTSA, DOT and a host of others have regulations that if you want to import a produc= t for sale it must be safe. It's not a new or novel concept, pretty much every country has some scheme like it.
-- Leo Bicknell - bicknell@ufp.org PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
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