In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Feb 2023: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Feb 2023: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 3356 LEVEL3 2016-03-06 2023-02-20 54825 PACKET 2016-04-15 2023-02-11 40065 CNSERVERS 2016-05-01 2023-02-27 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2023-02-22 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2023-02-28 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2023-02-25 25787 ROWE-NETWORKS 2016-10-21 2023-02-23 10796 TWC-10796-MIDWEST 2016-10-24 2023-02-22 271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2023-02-10 1403 EBOX 2016-11-12 2023-02-13 852 ASN852 2017-04-16 2023-02-20 7122 MTS-ASN 2017-05-16 2023-02-17 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2023-02-28 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2023-02-26 398836 2021-03-12 2023-02-27 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2023-02-20 44570 SEI-EUROPE-KFT 2022-05-07 2023-02-27 394414 E2WS 2022-05-08 2023-02-28 397086 GLOBAL-FRAG-NETWORKS-HOUSTON 2022-06-16 2023-02-27 11976 FIDN 2022-11-16 2023-02-22 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2023-02-21 21555 LHTC 2023-01-01 2023-02-24 33185 TGLO-VGLO 2023-02-04 2023-02-04 399852 2023-02-16 2023-02-26 62005 AdNet-Telecom 2023-02-27 2023-02-27 210546 2023-02-27 2023-02-28 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org