Am I correct in thinking that the SIDR work going on in the IETF takes the registries out of the real-time processing of route authentication/attestation? Is RPKI a stop-gap while we wait for full path validation? Should we be focusing our energies in that area? On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 2:19 PM, Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com> wrote:
On Dec 4, 2014, at 12:39 PM, John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:
On Dec 4, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> wrote:
Note that the claims that could ensue from an operator failing to follow best practices and then third-parties suffering an major operational outage is likely to be large
Undertaking that risk to the other services that everyone else presently
rely upon
(Whois, reverse DNS) is not reasonable
Which begs the question for me -- ARIN already operates services that operators rely upon. Why are they different? Does ARIN run no risk of litigation due to some perceived involvement of those services in someone's operational outage?
Has there been litigation against ARIN tied to, for example, reverse DNS? Or the IRR?
--Sandy